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The Foreign Policy of Poland

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The Foreign Policy of Poland

BY RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL

with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

Mr. Buell visited Poland in May and June, 1938, and is writing a book on the subject.

THE foreign policy of Poland, to a greater extent than that of most countries, is governed by history and geography. Poland lies between two great totalitarian powers, both of which, in the past, have demonstrated imperialistic ambitions at its expense. Nor has lack of natural frontiers improved Poland's position. Despite its control of the Free City of Danzig and the port of Gdynia, Poland has no secure access to the Baltic Sea or a fleet worthy of the name. The German navy, which dominates the Baltic, and German military forces—particularly air power—operating from Germany and East Prussia, would not find it difficult in a localized war to close the Vistula and cut the rail routes joining Poland to the Baltic.

Apart from the Carpathians and the Pripyet marshes, Poland has only flat land frontiers. It is doubtful whether fortifications on such a terrain could long arrest an invader of overwhelming force. No matter how bravely Poland might fight, it could hardly hope to win a localized war with either Russia or Germany. It must rely not only on its own military force, but also on diplomacy, to protect its security. Poland's greatest danger is isolation. If it cannot depend on allies or a collective system, its position will become extremely precarious.

Poland's second danger is internal. As a result of its desire to obtain "natural" frontiers and to recover ancient glories, Poland has succeeded in annexing territories containing many non-Poles. With the partition of Czechoslovakia, Poland now has the largest minority group in Europe, constituting at least a third of its total population. These minorities consist of nearly a million Germans (apart from the inhabitants of the Free City of Danzig), about a million and a half White Russians, over three million Jews, and five million Ukrainians.

Although the Jews regard themselves as loyal citizens, a strong anti-Semitic movement exists in Poland, which takes the form of an economic boycott and proposals for the adoption of *numerus clausus* legislation. Since the Jews play such a predominant

rôle in many spheres of economic activity, the anti-Semitic movement tends to weaken the economic structure of the country and undermine the loyalty shown by the Jewish population toward the régime.

Difficulties may also be created by the White Russian population inhabiting the northeastern area of Poland, and the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. The leading Ukrainian party, the U.N.D.O., while retaining its ultimate plan for unification of all Ukrainians, is now concentrating its efforts on achieving autonomy within Poland. The existence of these various minorities offers unfriendly neighbors an opportunity for intrigues, and would constitute a danger to Poland in the event of war. A country with several "Sudeten" areas, Poland does not seem to have adequately considered the importance of increasing the loyalty of these minorities to the régime.

Not satisfied with their existing territory, however, many Poles dream of new conquests. This romantic imperialism, together with an exaggerated ambition to be recognized as a great power—although Poland as yet lacks the resources necessary for such a position—constitute a further danger for the country. A Maritime and Colonial League, which claims to have 759,000 members organized in 5,850 groups, carries on with government approval propaganda in favor of colonies.¹⁻²

The Polish government has shown a legitimate concern in finding overseas outlets for immigration as a means of relieving a serious population problem. For this reason it has taken a deep interest in the Palestine question. Forty-five per cent of the Jewish emigrants to Palestine have come from Poland. The Polish government, with the approval of the French authorities, sent a commission to Madagascar to study the possibility of developing an outlet for Polish emigrants there. In the fall of 1937, moreover, Poland informed M. Delbos, French Foreign Minister, that it would formulate

1-2. *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny 1938* (Maritime and Colonial League Annual: Warsaw), p. 415.

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colonial demands when the redistribution of colonies was actually raised—presumably by Germany—and would insist that its vital necessities be considered. Poland also expressed interest in any international companies to be created for the exploitation of certain colonies, and any plan for European settlement overseas. The French Foreign Minister recognized the Polish demands in principle.³⁻⁴

Poles have long agitated for the return of the Polish district of Teschen; in addition, some of them would like to see the establishment of a common frontier with Hungary—a country with which Poland has historic and social ties. During the past few months the Polish government has not hesitated to apply force to obtain satisfaction in the Lithuanian and Teschen questions.⁵

THE POLICY OF BALANCE

Polish foreign policy is based on the principle of "balance." In Poland this principle has two objectives: to obtain outside assistance in case of attack by either Russia or Germany; and to keep Russia and Germany apart.⁶ For should these two powers go to war or form an alliance, Polish independence would be jeopardized.

To achieve the first aim Poland, until the advent of Hitler, made a sincere effort at collaboration with the League of Nations.⁷ It was a leading supporter of the ill-fated Geneva protocol of 1924 and the principle of sanctions generally, and applied sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian war. Its efforts at that time were inspired by a desire to create a general European system which would underwrite Poland's frontiers.

To meet the menace of non-League states, notably Germany and Russia, Poland also adopted a policy of alliances. First it concluded an alliance with France on January 19, 1921.⁸ A few months later, on March 3, 1921, Poland and Rumania concluded a much more precise alliance, in which they promised to give each other armed assistance.⁹⁻¹⁰

An effort to effect a rapprochement between Poland and the Little Entente was made in Novem-

ber 1921, when Foreign Minister Skirmunt of Poland and M. Benes signed a treaty of friendship at Prague. The agreement provided for benevolent neutrality in the event of an attack on either by a third state, permitted free passage of war materials, and prohibited propaganda directed against the other. Poland was to disinterest itself in the Slovakian question, and Czechoslovakia in the matter of Eastern Galicia.¹¹ Had this agreement been ratified, a basis might have been laid for solid opposition to German expansion. Poland was still bitter, however, over the attitude of Czechoslovakia toward the Polish-Russian war of 1920 and the Teschen question. Moreover, it feared Russia, not Germany, and failed to ratify the agreement.

By 1923, having secured international title to Eastern Galicia, Poland realized the importance of coming to terms with the Little Entente; and in a speech in the Polish Parliament of July 25, 1923, Foreign Minister Seyda proposed that the Little Entente be organized into a four-power pact, mutually guaranteeing the frontiers of the four states concerned.¹² Following the Locarno agreements, which pleased Czechoslovakia no more than Poland, Foreign Minister Skrzynski went to Prague in April 1926 and again proposed an alliance. But, according to Polish sources,¹³ Czechoslovakia declined on the ground that Poland might soon go to war with Germany over the so-called Corridor, with Lithuania over Vilna, and with Russia over the eastern frontier. An alliance with Poland would have strengthened Czechoslovakia strategically against Germany, and it was this lack of unity among the Slavic states of Central Europe which in 1938 contributed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

Poland's hope of guaranteeing its frontiers against Germany and Russia through its French alliance received a blow with the conclusion of Locarno agreements in 1925. These agreements guaranteed Germany's western frontier with France but not its eastern frontier with Poland. To overcome Poland's opposition to having Germany occupy a permanent seat on the Council, the League gave Poland a semi-permanent seat in 1926. When Germany reoccupied the Rhineland ten years later the value of the French alliance, as well as the League, to Poland was further impaired, for it became more impossible than ever for France to march to Poland's aid.

11. F. J. Vondracek, *The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 180.

12. Casimir Smogorzewski, "Poland and Czechoslovakia," *Gazeta Polska* (Warsaw), June 8, 1938.

13. Smogorzewski, "Poland's Foreign Relations," cited.

3-4. *Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Polonaise*, 1938, No. 266, p. 2.

5. Cf. pp. 213-17.

6. Cf. three articles by C. Smogorzewski, "Poland's Foreign Relations," *Slavonic Review* (London), 1937, 1938.

7. Alexandre Bregman, *La Pologne et la Société des Nations* (University of Geneva, 1932, Thesis No. 7).

8. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. XVIII, p. 12. While this treaty did not commit either party to more than consultation in the event of attack, it was followed by the military convention of June 27, 1922, the terms of which were not published.

9-10. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, p. 78.

Poland was also offended when France considered the Four-Power Pact initiated by Italy in 1933. Although the original proposal, calling for treaty revision (obviously at the expense of Poland), was finally made innocuous, the fact that this pact was concluded without Polish participation caused deep offense in Warsaw. Meanwhile, certain scandals arising out of French investments in Poland strengthened opinion in that country that France regarded Poland more as a colony than an independent power.

Having unsuccessfully attempted to build up an alliance system to check both powers, Polish diplomacy has since endeavored to separate Russia and Germany by making friends with one at the expense of the other. Post-war Poland first experienced the fear of a Russo-German combination when these two powers concluded the agreement of Rapallo in 1922. During the French occupation of the Ruhr in the following year, Russia threatened to mobilize if Poland attempted to take advantage of the crisis to seize East Prussia.¹⁴ This apprehension was decreased when Poland concluded a non-aggression pact on July 28, 1932 with Soviet Russia. But the hopes aroused by this pact were not realized. Fear of communism is probably as great in Poland as in Hungary.

To this fear of communism was added Poland's historical fear of Pan-Slavism. Since the war, Poland has continued to live in dread of Russia's return to Europe. When the French Foreign Minister Barthou proposed that Poland join France and Russia in the so-called Eastern Pact of 1934, Poland declined. Not only was it unwilling to guarantee the frontiers of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, but Warsaw suspected that France was attempting to transfer to Moscow its obligations under the Polish alliance; and it realized that Russia would be in a far better position than France to send troops to the aid of Poland in the event of German attack. But Poland does not want Russian troops on its soil because, remembering the history of the Partitions at the end of the eighteenth century, it fears they will never withdraw. Nor does Poland wish to serve as the spearhead of a Red Army attack on Germany.

The situation was made worse, as far as Poland was concerned, when Russia joined the League of Nations in 1934, and France and Czechoslovakia concluded their alliances with Russia in 1935. From the point of view of geography, Russia could go to the aid of Czechoslovakia only by crossing the territory of Poland or Rumania. But Poland does

not admit this right of passage to Russian troops.¹⁵ Consequently, any effort by Russia to extend military assistance to Czechoslovakia involved the risk of war with Poland.

Rivalry with Russia has also arisen in the Baltic area. At the end of the World War these states had reason to fear Russian imperialism. And Poland, after the war, hoped to build up a Baltic bloc under its leadership to come to terms with Russia as a unit. Russia, for its part, hoped to keep the Baltic states divided so as to increase its own influence; and showed its hostility to Poland by making an agreement with Lithuania in July 1920 recognizing Vilna as part of that country.¹⁶ Russia's success in concluding this bilateral agreement marked the defeat of Poland's efforts to create a solid Baltic bloc. The Polish occupation of Vilna in October 1920 was partly in order to dislocate the frontier between Russia and Lithuania.

Although Russian aggression in the Baltic seems no longer an issue, Russia and the Baltic countries live in fear of German aggression. The spearhead of a German movement would be Lithuania, not only because of the Memel question, which has plagued the relations of Kovno and Berlin, but because it is the logical jumping-off place for a German move on Leningrad. Even if the rumor that Soviet Russia and Lithuania have a secret alliance is incorrect,¹⁷ it would probably be to the interest of Soviet Russia to stop a German offensive by coming to the aid of Lithuania. But to do so, Russia would probably have to cross Polish territory. Thus the interests of Poland and Russia have seriously clashed over both the Lithuanian and Czechoslovak questions.

Poland took advantage of the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 to settle its accounts with Lithuania, and thereby weaken Russian influence in this area. Although Vilna was the capital

15. In a letter of June 26, 1936 Foreign Minister Beck made a declaration to the League Council emphasizing that sanctions against Italy under Article XVI had been taken by virtue of the "sovereign decision" of each government. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement 150, p. 339. On April 29, 1937 M. Spaak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, declared in Parliament that the right of passage under Article XVI depended on (1) the consent of the Belgian government, and (2) the organization of a "common action" against the aggressor by the League Council. *Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Représentants*, April 29, 1937, p. 1287. The French text, differing from the English text, says that League members "prennent les dispositions nécessaires pour faciliter le passage à travers leur territoire des forces de tout Membre de la Société qui participe à une action commune pour faire respecter les engagements de la Société." The "action commune" envisaged by the French text apparently consists of those measures voted by the League Council on which Poland would have a veto. Cf. footnote 31.

16. Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, cited, p. 717.

17. The two governments are bound by a non-aggression pact of September 28, 1926.

14. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (New York, Cape & Smith, 1930), pp. 451, 831.

of the medieval duchy, the present Lithuanian nationality in the city is less than one per cent of the total population, 66 per cent being Poles. Between the Treaty of Union with Poland of 1569 and the Partition of 1772, the Lithuanian upper classes were Polonized and Vilna became a center of Polish culture. Nevertheless, an awakening Lithuanian nationalism began to claim the city at the end of the last century; and in 1918 it was made the capital of the Lithuanian Republic. After various armies fought over its possession, Russia ceded the city to Lithuania by a peace treaty of July 12, 1920. Clashes subsequently took place with Polish troops, leading to the armistice at Suwalki in October 1920 and the drawing of the famous Curzon Line under League mediation which allotted Vilna to Lithuania. But on October 9, 1920, the day before the agreement was to enter into force, the city was occupied by the Polish General, Zeligowski. Although Poland disavowed the General, he declined to evacuate the region so that the League might hold a plebiscite. After further efforts of the League had met with failure, the Diet of Vilna voted to unite with Poland, a decision ratified by the Polish Parliament on March 24, 1922. On March 15, 1923 the Conference of Ambassadors confirmed a frontier which left Vilna with Poland. Lithuania declined to recognize it, and subsequently proclaimed Vilna as the capital in its constitution. It also declined to have any diplomatic or economic relations with Poland, even refusing to allow railroad connections, or to accord any rights to the Polish minority. This "dead frontier," 300 miles long, lasted for 18 years and served as a constant obstacle to peace.

When on March 11, 1938, during the Austrian crisis, a frontier incident took place causing the death of a Polish soldier on Lithuanian territory, the Polish government addressed an ultimatum to Kovno on March 17, demanding unconditional restoration of diplomatic relations within 48 hours as the only means of guaranteeing security. At the same time, it mobilized troops along the Lithuanian frontier. The ultimatum was far less drastic than the demand of the Polish nationalists, who (despite a run on the Warsaw banks) clamored for a Polish naval base in Lithuania, a tariff union between the two countries, and the suppression of those articles in the Lithuanian constitution designating Vilna as the capital. Some even demanded complete annexation, as before 1772.¹⁸ The moderation of the ultimatum may have been due to the

pressure of France, Britain and Russia. Poland did not go further possibly because of the belief that Russia, while accepting a settlement of the frontier question, would not tolerate complete domination of Lithuania by Poland. Failing support from Soviet Russia, the Kovno government accepted the Polish ultimatum, promising to restore diplomatic relations before April 13 and to open railway and postal traffic. While the Lithuanian constitution still contains the article proclaiming Vilna to be its capital, the settlement of March 1938 undoubtedly increased Polish influence in Lithuania and constituted a set-back for Soviet Russia.

The anti-Russian school, carrying on the Pilsudski tradition, believes that Poland can best escape being crushed by its two powerful neighbors by forming an alliance with Germany to dismember Russia and drive Soviet influence out of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania.¹⁹ The Promethean movement, perhaps the most active branch of this school, believes that Russia is the "sick man" of the twentieth century and that, since it will probably be divided up, Poland should get its share.²⁰ Should Poland join Russia against Germany the result would in fact work against the interest of Poland, because Germany would then be tempted to come to terms with Moscow rather than face an antagonistic Russo-Polish alliance. The Promethean movement proposes, therefore, that Poland "liberate" the subject nationalities of Soviet Russia, thus restoring Poland to the position it had in Europe under the Jagellon dynasty. The creation, at Soviet expense, of an independent Ukraine and Georgia bound to Poland would, it is alleged, remove the constant pressure against Poland from the east. Thus one writer states: "The disintegration of Russia into her former component parts is to the fundamental interest of the Republic of Poland. . . . This is the only means of extracting Poland from the constant danger of being crushed between the two present-day powers represented by her eastern and western neighbors."²¹ The Promethean movement even envisages the "liberation" of Siberia from the "yoke" of Russian oppression.²²

Should Russia become involved in war with Japan, it is not impossible that the Polish govern-

19. Cf. E. Studnicki, *Polen im Politischen System Europas* (Berlin, 1936).

20. Adolf Bochenski, *Miedzy Niemcami or Rosja* (Between Germany and Russia: Warsaw, Polityka, 1937).

21. J. Dabrowski, "Poland and the Future War," quoted by T. Radwanski, "The Geopolitical Situation of Poland and the Promethean Movement," *Wschód-Orient*, No. 4 (1935). The same view is advanced by T. Radwanski, "The Promethean Movement and the Potential War Strength of the U.S.S.R.," *ibid.*, No. 4 (1936).

22. W. Pelc, "The Siberian Question and the Promethean Movement," *Wschód-Orient*, No. 1-2 (1937).

18. For a summary of these events, cf. J. Rappaport, "Chronique Polonaise," *Le Monde Slave* (Paris), May 1938, Vol. II, p. 250.

ment would endeavor to put some of these ideas into effect. It is doubtful, however, whether Poland, even with Japan's assistance, could dismember Russia along the periphery unless the U.S.S.R. went to pieces at the center. Even then, it is not likely that Germany would allow Poland alone to devour the remains. Germany itself would like to "liberate" the Ukraine, at the expense of both Soviet Russia and Poland, and have it come under the hegemony of Berlin.

The weakening of Russia may serve as a temptation to Poland; but the further Russia is weakened, the greater becomes the danger that Germany will dominate not only southwestern Russia but Poland itself. Meanwhile, strained relations between Poland and Russia have worked against Polish economic interests. It is doubtful whether this country can solve its serious overpopulation problem without developing an extensive trade with Russia. Some Poles believe that Russia might even absorb, economically speaking, a number of Polish immigrants. Today Polish trade with Russia is only one per cent of the total, although the Russian market was of vital importance to Congress Poland before the World War. An exclusive understanding between Poland and Russia remains unlikely for ideological as well as historical reasons. Yet Poland has more to gain, economically and politically, than any one else from a general movement to bring Russia into some orderly and peaceful relationship to the rest of Europe.²³⁻²⁴

POLAND AND GERMANY

Owing to the heated controversy over Danzig, the so-called Corridor, and Upper Silesia, Poland's relations with Germany until 1933 were worse than with any other power. Leaders of the German Republic could not believe that Poland was more than a "temporary" state (*saison Staat*); and the policy adopted at Rapallo undoubtedly was inspired by a desire to destroy Poland. Republican Germany engaged in a series of controversies with Poland over frontier and other questions, and carried on worldwide propaganda to convince neutral opinion that the Polish frontier was one of the major injustices of the Versailles settlement. Stresemann, in his letter to the Crown Prince of September 7, 1925, wrote that "the third great task of Germany is the readjustment of our Eastern frontiers, the recovery of Danzig, the Polish Corridor and a cor-

rection of the frontier in Upper Silesia."²⁵ In 1931 Chancellor Brüning sounded out the leading European capitals to see to what extent they would accept territorial revision at the expense of Poland.²⁶

As German demands against Poland increased and Poland's alliances weakened,²⁷ Poland began a searching reconsideration of its foreign policy. Fearing that Poland would have to come to terms with one or the other neighboring dictatorships, Pilsudski chose Germany. He was the first statesman to forecast the rising power of the new Germany and the significance of the Nazi movement. His intuition also indicated that neither France nor Britain could be counted on to maintain the treaty structure of Europe by force. On January 26, 1934 Pilsudski, without consulting his ally, France, made the famous non-aggression agreement with Hitler. The governments expressed their determination to "base their mutual relations on the principles contained in the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. . . . Both governments declare that it is their intention to reach direct understanding on problems concerning their mutual relations. . . . In no case, however, shall they have recourse to force in order to settle such questions under dispute." The declaration remains in force during a period of ten years, but if neither government gives notice of its termination six months before or after this period of time it shall continue to remain in force.²⁸ That Hitler could drop so suddenly the revisionist campaign of the German Republic represented one of the most surprising *volte-faces* in modern history. But, as a result, Germany made the first dent in the French alliance system, removed the danger of an attack from Poland, and secured a shield against a Russian attack, enabling it to concentrate its forces against Austria. The German-Polish non-aggression pact ended the new isolation into which Nazi Germany had been plunged.

Poland, through this agreement, cast off its semi-colonial status and was recognized as a great power. Having thus demonstrated its complete independence of France, Poland now became an object of solicitation by all Europe. This agreement dispelled the bitterness which had existed between Poland and the German Republic. The German campaign for revision of the Polish frontier, the

25. Gustav Stresemann, *His Diaries, Letters and Papers* (London, Macmillan, 1935-1937, 2 vols.), Vol. 2, p. 503.

26. Casimir Smogorzewski, "Poland: Free, Peaceful, Strong," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1935.

27. Cf. p. 211.

28. For an official translation, cf. *Documents on International Affairs*, edited by J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (New York, Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 424.

23-24. On November 26, 1938 it was announced that the Polish and Russian governments had reaffirmed the non-aggression pact of 1932, and had agreed to promote trade and settle a number of current issues. Moscow is said to have withdrawn support from the Polish Communists. This agreement indicates a marked swing from the pro-German orientation of Polish foreign policy formerly followed. *New York Times*, November 27, 28, 1938.

Polish-German tariff war, and the support hitherto given by Germany to the minorities within Poland came to an end or was moderated. Poland, without fear of attack, could now consolidate its position in the frontier areas, which it believed it could do since its population increases more rapidly than that of Germany. Momentarily Poland had diverted German expansion toward other parts of Europe and gained time to rearm. In view of the unwillingness of either France or Britain to prevent treaty violations by Germany, and continued uncertainty as to the internal French situation, the Polish-German agreement undoubtedly served the immediate interests of Poland. For the time being at least, it prevented Poland from becoming engaged with Germany in the type of controversy in which Czechoslovakia soon found itself involved. Poland, however, paid a price for this settlement. Thus it was obliged to acquiesce in the Nazification of the Free City of Danzig, subject to the retention of certain economic rights,²⁹ and it contributed to the enormous strengthening of Germany. Poland now ceased being a *status quo* power and moved into the revisionist camp.

The actual text of the non-aggression pact of 1934 expressly exempted from its provisions the prior obligations of Poland, such as those arising out of the French and Rumanian alliances and the League Covenant. Technically there was nothing to prevent Poland from continuing its former policy. But in fact Poland proceeded to go considerably beyond the published provisions of the non-aggression pact. It showed its hostility to the whole thesis of "collective security" as compared with the German thesis of "bilateral pacts." Whether or not this attitude arose out of a secret agreement, the real explanation for Poland's policy was the belief that the League had become an ideological alliance inspired by Russia and directed against the fascist states—a belief reinforced by the withdrawal of Germany, Italy and Japan. In an address to the foreign affairs commission of the Polish Sejm in January 1938, Foreign Minister Beck expressed the fear that "the meetings at Geneva had become doctrinaire conferences, to the detriment of world politics." It was impossible for Poland, he said, "to ally itself with doctrinaire blocs or to allow our country to become the instrument of a policy which it has not itself fixed."³⁰ In the fall of 1938 Poland declined to stand for re-election to the League Council, in marked contrast with the eagerness hitherto shown.³¹

29. Cf. M. S. Wertheimer, "The Nazification of Danzig," *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 1, 1936.

30. Rappaport, *Le Monde Slave*, May 1938, cited.

One of the first consequences of the non-aggression pact was the action of Poland at Geneva in the fall of 1934, when Foreign Minister Beck stated that, pending the introduction of a general system of minority protection, Poland was "compelled to refuse all cooperation with the international organizations in the matter of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minority protection" under the minorities agreement of June 1919.³² One reason for this act was to prevent Russia from intervening in Polish affairs under the guise of protecting minorities—a right which it would have as a member of the League Council. Poland's action served as a precursor to the German denunciation of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the following March.³³

Meanwhile, Poland had no intention of breaking off its alliance with France. Warsaw could safely make friends with Berlin only if Poland retained certain bargaining counters and remained strong. Consequently, Colonel Beck proceeded to strengthen the Polish-Rumanian alliance, now made possible as a result of the resignation of Foreign Minister Titulescu who had favored a pro-Russian policy. When Germany reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936, Poland offered to mobilize if France would do so. But France declined, thus confirming Poland's diagnosis of the European situation.

In an effort to repair the balance of power damaged by the Rhineland reoccupation, Marshal Rydz-Smigly went to Paris in the fall of 1936 following a visit of General Gamelin, French Chief of Staff, to Warsaw. Here the Franco-Polish alliance was strengthened in an agreement of September,³⁴ and the Marshal was reported to have promised that Poland would fulfill its obligations under the League Covenant in the event that Czechoslovakia was the object of unprovoked aggression—a

31. On September 16, 1938 M. Komarnicki, Polish delegate, informed the League Assembly that his government agreed that "it has the sovereign right to determine the attitude which it must adopt in each international situation regarding the application of Article XVI of the Covenant." He reiterated the view he had expressed before the Committee of Twenty-Eight dealing with the amendment of the Covenant. *Verbatim Record of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly*, Fifth Plenary Meeting, September 16, 1938; also *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 180, p. 15.

32. Cf. League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 125, Records of the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

33. A Polish commentator insists that the Polish declaration did not constitute a denunciation of the 1919 minorities treaty. S. J. Paprocki, *Minority Affairs and Poland* (Warsaw, Nationality Research Institute, 1935), p. 25. But this statement is hardly correct, if Poland henceforth denied the right of intervention to the League Council expressly granted by that agreement.

34. Foreign Minister Delbos, *Journal Officiel, Débats parlementaires*, Chambre des Députés, Session Extraordinaire 1936, 1ère Séance du 29 Décembre 1936.

statement later denied.³⁵ In return, France agreed to make a loan of \$63,000,000 to Poland, partly for the purpose of developing an industrial area capable of producing munitions.

When Germany struck an even more fundamental blow at European equilibrium by annexing Austria in March 1938, Poland did nothing to correct the balance, the official view being that the Danubian area was of secondary interest to Poland. In the midst of the subsequent Czechoslovak crisis, Poland even took what amounted to a pro-German attitude. The official press openly attacked the Prague government, while marked attention was paid to the complaints of the Slovaks by a country which treated its own minorities far less liberally than did Czechoslovakia.

France was an ally of both Poland and Czechoslovakia; and Poland, in its alliance of 1921, had promised to consult with France on all questions of foreign policy. But despite the new loan from Paris, Warsaw actually demonstrated its hostility toward another French ally. Such a situation would be difficult to duplicate in modern diplomatic history. During the spring and summer of 1938 the British and French Ambassadors in Warsaw pleaded with the Polish government not to weaken Czechoslovakia in this crisis, nor to join Germany in an attack for the purpose of dismemberment. In May and again in June the Polish government gave certain rather lukewarm assurances, but Polish policy was to change completely when Britain and France proposed that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudeten area to Germany.³⁶

If Czechoslovakia now becomes a satellite of Germany, obviously German pressure on Poland will greatly increase. Once in control of the Prague government, Germany will be in a position to carry on intrigues in the Polish Ukraine and build a corridor in the direction of Kiev. Had Poland stood with France and Britain against Germany and mobilized its troops on the Silesian border, Germany would hardly have gone as far as it did. It may be argued that in assisting German efforts to dismember Czechoslovakia, Poland thus injured its own interests. To understand Polish policy in this question, it is necessary to review the relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia.

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Although both belong to the Slav race, Poland and Czechoslovakia have had a long history of

mutual jealousy. For a time during the sixteenth century the Polish monarchy of the Jagellons occupied also the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary, but Czechs and Poles intermittently struggled for possession of the same territory in Central Europe. Following the battle of the White Mountain in 1620, Bohemia lost its independence and thereafter the Czechs became wards of the Hapsburgs. In their struggle in the nineteenth century to recover their independence, these Slavs looked to Russia for help.

During the same period, however, some Poles, comparatively well-treated in Galicia by the Hapsburgs, developed an undying hatred of Russia, which they regarded as their greatest enemy. Although President Masaryk warned against "Pan-Slav and pro-Russian illusions,"³⁷ the difference over the Russian question continued after the war. Czechoslovakia joined the western powers in opposing the cession of Eastern Galicia to Poland. Poles charge that during the period Czechoslovakia desired a common frontier with Russia at the expense of Poland.³⁸⁻³⁹ When the Polish army was driven back to Warsaw by the Bolsheviks in 1920, the Czechoslovak government, influenced by the Communist attitude of local labor unions, prohibited for a time the transport of munitions across its territory and also objected to the passage of reinforcements from Hungary. While Germany took much the same attitude,⁴⁰ Poles continue to hold this incident against the Czechs. Although President Masaryk wrote toward the end of the war that, "without a free Poland, there cannot be a free Bohemia,"⁴¹ he warned General Weygand, when he passed through Prague as a member of the Anglo-French mission to Poland during the midst of the Polish-Bolshevik war, that it was useless to organize assistance for the Poles because capture of Warsaw was inevitable, and such assistance would destroy the influence of the Western powers in the subsequent negotiations for peace. When Lord d'Abernon's book recording this conversation was published in 1931, it deepened Polish animosity.⁴²

37. T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1927), p. 143.

38-39. Waclaw Lypaciewicz, *Polish-Czech Relations* (Warsaw, 1936).

40. I.e. Germany closed the Kiel canal to the shipment of munitions to Poland on the ground that such shipments violated its neutrality. This attitude was over-ruled by the Permanent Court of International Justice. Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, Series A, *Collection of Judgments*, No. 1, June 1923; R. L. Buell, *International Relations* (New York, Holt, 1929), p. 134.

41. *L'Europe Nouvelle*, February 2, 1918, p. 179.

42. Lord d'Abernon, *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World* (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1931). The author says that Paderewski was almost as gloomy as President Masaryk.

35. The Polish Embassy in Washington on December 31, 1936 denied that this obligation was undertaken. *New York Herald Tribune*, January 1, 1937.

36. Cf. p. 218.

Whatever its attitude toward communism might be, Czechoslovakia was pro-Russian, Poland believed. In view of the wide gulf between the gentry outlook dominating Poland and the staid bourgeois outlook of Czechoslovakia, it was not difficult for Poles to believe that Prague was a hotbed of communism. The existence of a common frontier for nearly a thousand kilometers between Czechoslovakia and Poland increased the possibility that Prague might cooperate with Moscow in stirring up trouble among the White Russian and Ukrainian minorities. These fears were intensified when Russia and Czechoslovakia concluded their pact of mutual assistance in 1935. The fact that Czechoslovakia made greater political and social progress after the World War than other new countries also aroused Poland's jealousy.

THE TESCHEN QUESTION

The most concrete source of controversy between these two states was over the Teschen question. This district forms the southeast corner of the province of Silesia; and, after the fourteenth century, formed part of the "lands of the Bohemian Crown."⁴³ Although the Duchy of Teschen is small, it is important as a mining and railway center. According to the Austrian census of 1910, nearly 55 per cent of the population of the district, totaling 426,000, was Polish-speaking, 18.04 per cent spoke German, and 27.11 per cent spoke Czech.

On November 5, 1918 the two local councils, the Polish National Council and the Czech National Local Committee, agreed to a provisional frontier following ethnic lines. But during the next month the Czechs became indignant when Poland announced that it would hold elections in the area. When Polish troops occupied almost all of the duchy,⁴⁴ Prague demanded the evacuation of eastern Silesia by Poland, and Czech troops seized the city of Bohumin, forcing the Polish troops to withdraw. After vainly endeavoring to hold a plebiscite and then to arbitrate the question, the Conference of Ambassadors, in an agreement of July 28, 1920, divided up the duchy between the two countries. The award gave Poland the eastern part, including a large part of the town of Teschen; to Czechoslovakia it gave the town of Frystat, the whole of the Karvin mining area and a considerable section of the railway. Czechoslovakia's share was considerably larger than that agreed upon in November 1918.⁴⁵

43. H. W. V. Temperley, ed., *History of the Paris Peace Conference* (London, Oxford University Press, 1924), vol. IV, p. 349.

44. Kamil Krofta, *A Short History of Czechoslovakia* (New York, McBride, 1934), p. 148.

This division clearly subordinated the ethnic to the economic principle.

Nevertheless, for a time Poland attempted to improve its relations with Czechoslovakia and, although an alliance was not signed, on April 23, 1925 the two governments concluded an agreement providing for the arbitration and conciliation of all disputes except problems arising from territorial questions.⁴⁶

As a result of this and other agreements, relations between the two Slavic countries improved. Finally realizing the German danger, Czech statements hinted in 1933 that it might be desirable for Poland to join the Little Entente.⁴⁷ But a new difference arose when the Little Entente accepted the Four-Power Pact in its final form, while Poland rejected it *in toto*. The conclusion of the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934 was a final blow at Slavic understanding; thereafter Polish campaigns on behalf of the Polish minority in Teschen were intensified. In March 1934 tension reached its height over the arrest of three Poles in Teschen who predicted a Polish invasion, and Poland in turn expelled 21 Czechoslovak citizens and prohibited the sale of three Czech newspapers. Warsaw declined the offer of Czechoslovakia to arbitrate the controversy under the terms of the 1925 convention or refer it to the League—an attitude which reinforced the suspicion that Poland had ulterior motives. Subsequently Poland charged that Czechoslovakia had granted asylum to Ukrainian refugees from Poland—a charge which Prague denied. The controversy continued until October 1935, when the Czech government withdrew the exequatur of the Polish Consul at Moravska-Ostrava, charging that he was intriguing with extremists in Carpathian Ruthenia and Slovakia and stimulating Polish propaganda in Teschen. Warsaw struck back by expelling two Czechoslovak consuls, and announcing the withdrawal of its Minister from Prague. It again rejected the Czech offer of arbitration under the 1925 agreement. Subject to fluctuations, this tense atmosphere persisted.

In the spring of 1938 the Polish government again complained that Communist propaganda was emanating from Czechoslovakia against Poland.⁴⁸ Prague replied that it would repress any

45. Cf. Temperley, *History of the Paris Peace Conference*, cited, map, vol. IV, p. 348.

46. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Vol. LXVIII, p. 383.

47. Cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1936* (London, Oxford University Press, 1925-1937), vol. I, p. 287.

48. "The Czech Branch of the 'Komintern,'" *Gazeta Polska*, April 2, 1938. A second note was sent by Warsaw in July, complaining that the note of March 22 had not been given adequate consideration, *The Times*, July 28, 1938.

illegal activities on presentation of proof from the Polish government, but could not repress freedom of speech.

During the Czech crisis in September 1938, the Polish government remained vigilant, consistently demanding the same treatment for the Polish minority in Teschen as that extended to the Germans in Sudetenland. Following the Anglo-French proposals of September 18, 1938, and Mussolini's speech of the same day calling for "plebiscites for all nationalities that demand them," Poland became more precise. In a note of September 21, the Polish government referred to a declaration from Prague that the Polish minority would not be discriminated against. Warsaw insisted, however, that it would expect a settlement of the Polish minority question "in the same manner as that of the territories of the German population," and at the same time denounced the Polish-Czech agreement of 1925.⁴⁹ The Polish government also protested to Britain and France that they had not adequately considered Polish claims. A semi-official statement added that if the Czech government accepted the Anglo-French proposals, Poland would demand the annexation of that part of Teschen-Silesia granted to Poland under the agreement of November 5, 1918.⁵⁰

Troop movements now took place, a "volunteer corps" was organized, and popular demonstrations were held in favor of redeeming the "lands beyond the Olza."⁵¹ The Polish-Czech frontier was closed by the Prague government; Poles and Czechs were killed in clashes. Meanwhile, the Polish and Hungarian authorities asked Hitler and Mussolini for help in advancing their claims. When the Soviet government, in a note of September 23, warned that it might denounce the non-aggression pact of 1932 if Polish troops crossed the Czech frontier, Poland replied that this affair did not concern Russia,⁵² while Foreign Minister Beck proceeded to confer with the Japanese Ambassador. The determination of the Polish government to act was

increased when the text of the Munich agreement became known. Poland had not been invited to the Munich conference, and could not consider itself bound by its decisions.

On the day of the Munich communiqué, the Polish government sent an ultimatum—its third note since September 21—demanding the evacuation of Teschen, and the sections west from Ropice to Darkov, by the next noon; surrender by October 10 of the districts of Bohumin, Frystat and Jablunkov; and suggesting a plebiscite in the districts of Frydek and Slezska Ostrava.⁵³ Despite an appeal from Secretary Hull not to use force, and an offer of mediation from the British and French Ambassadors, the government indicated that the return of Teschen-Silesia could be realized only by Poland itself. On October 1 Prague yielded, and during the next ten days the Polish troops took over the stipulated areas.

Apparently this settlement gives to Poland the area allotted in the provisional agreement of November 5, 1918, and in addition the district of Bohumin. The latter district Poland desired because it was an important strategic and railway center which Warsaw did not wish to have dominated by Germany. In 1918 a majority of the people in these districts, except Bohumin, may have been Poles but, as a result of immigration from Czechoslovakia proper and other causes, the population in all four districts except Jablunkov is predominantly Czech today.⁵⁴ According to the 1930 census the population is as follows:⁵⁵

	Frystat	Bohumin	Teschen	Jablunkov	Totals
Total	91,054	51,011	53,976	31,358	227,399
Czechs	52,285	35,714	23,204	9,436	120,639
Poles	29,790	4,755	21,424	20,261	76,230

Poland justified the annexation of 120,000 Czechs and 18,000 Germans in order to "liberate" 80,000 Poles, on the ground of restoring the situation existing in 1918.

In the occupied areas Polish authorities, declaring that thousands of Poles had left the territory after it had been taken over by Prague in 1919, went to the extreme of posting notices stating that Czechs must leave before November 1.⁵⁶⁻⁵⁷

In securing Teschen, Poland improved its strategic position against Germany and annexed rich coal and coke resources.

53. *Prager Presse*, October 4, 1938.

54. The population of Frydek and Slezska Ostrava is over 95 per cent Czech. The plebiscite proposal was dropped.

55. Figures taken from Czechoslovak Statistical Office, *Statistický Lexikon obcí v Republice Československá* (Prague, 1935), Vol. II.

56-57. Havas dispatch, *Le Temps*, October 14, 1938. It was not clear whether the order applied only to Czechs who had established their residence since 1919, or to all Czech inhabitants.

49. *The Times*, September 22, 1938; *Le Temps*, September 23, 1938.

50. Cf. the semi-official statement in *Ilustrowany Kuryer Codzienny*, quoted in *The Times*, September 22, 1938.

51. Cf. M. W. Fodor dispatch, Prague, *New York Sun*, October 6, 1938.

52. *Le Temps*, September 25, 1938. It was reported that in a radius of 200 miles along the Polish frontier between Kiev and White Russia 30 divisions of Russian infantry were concentrated, mostly on a war footing—a stronger force than the whole peacetime Polish army. The Russian divisions numbered nearly 350,000 men and were supported by 3,000 planes, 2,000 tanks, and five cavalry corps. Russia could very easily create a Sudeten problem within Poland by endeavoring to liberate "the Ukrainians and White Russians there." Riga dispatch, *The Times*, September 26, 1938.

The Polish public hailed the return of Teschen, and the press expressed the hope that a firm basis had now been laid for cooperation between Warsaw and Prague. Nevertheless, the Polish government took the initiative in supporting Hungarian claims, one government newspaper, *Kurjer Polski*, even advocating Slovak independence under joint Polish-Hungarian guarantee. For many years, Poland had talked of establishing a common frontier with Hungary at the expense of Czechoslovakia, thus erecting a new barrier to German expansion. Poland had never ratified the Treaty of Trianon which had deprived Hungary of Slovakia, Ruthenia, and other territories. Warsaw now asked that these territories—or at least Ruthenia—be returned to Budapest, although neither had a majority of Hungarians.

If Ruthenia were returned to Budapest and a common frontier established between Poland and Hungary, a new barrier to German expansion across Czechoslovakia into the Balkans or Rumania and Russia might be erected. Both Warsaw and Budapest hoped to secure the support of the great powers and Rumania to this idea. On October 19 Foreign Minister Beck paid a visit to King Carol, to win him over to the Polish-Hungarian project by offering Rumania the southeast corner of Carpathian Ruthenia, containing 40,000 Rumanians.⁵⁸ His visit met with little success, because Rumania did not wish to anger Germany, or accept a precedent which might later be applied against it to secure the return of Transylvania to Hungary. For obvious reasons, neither France nor Britain took any interest in these Polish designs; and Soviet Russia, which had more at stake in blocking further German expansion than any other power, could not be expected to support the Poles in view of past irritations. Italy alone originally supported Hungarian ambitions,⁵⁹ but it soon was evident that Mussolini could not pursue a policy in Central Europe independent of Hitler. The Munich agreement of September 30 had provided that, in the event that the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia was not settled within three months, it should be referred to a further meeting of the four great powers. But on October 16 it was reported that both Germany and Italy opposed a common frontier between Poland and Hungary.⁶⁰ On October 31 it was announced that Czechoslovakia and Hungary had agreed that their differences should be arbitrated jointly by Germany and Italy.⁶¹ The desire of Hungary to have Poland

act as one of the arbiters over the Ruthenian question was set aside. Although the Vienna award of November 2 gave Hungary a part of Ruthenia, it does not establish a common Polish-Hungarian frontier.⁶²⁻⁶³ Thus, despite the Teschen prize, Poland suffered a major diplomatic defeat,⁶⁴ which has caused a renewal of the ever-present feeling of mistrust of Germany.

For a number of years before the Munich crisis Poland had played with the idea of a great bloc of states stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea—the New Europe. Foreign Minister Beck made many visits to the capitals of the countries concerned with a view to promoting the project. It might have had a chance of success had Poland been willing to bury its differences with Czechoslovakia and Lithuania and to accept commitments linking up the Baltic, Little and Balkan Ententes.⁶⁵ But Poland chose to cast its lot with Germany in 1934 and follow bilateral policies. Events have proved that Poland lacked the strength to erect a barrier against Germany once Hitler had established his influence over Vienna and Prague.

Partly as a result of its own decisions, Poland finds itself isolated from the Western democracies if not Soviet Russia, while its economic dependence on Germany is steadily increasing. Thus a revived Polish-German trade agreement of July 1, 1938 provides that hereafter Polish coal shipments to Vienna are to be forwarded via Germany instead of Czechoslovakia; and apparently Germany agreed to increase its purchases of Polish coal at the expense of imports from Czechoslovakia. About 20 per cent of Poland's foreign trade is now dependent on Germany. Moreover, on October 17, 1938, Poland accepted a 120,000,000-zloty credit from Germany, which is to be used for German equipment and machinery in exchange for Polish foodstuffs and lumber.

62-63. Poland professed to believe that the award was only provisional and threatened to move troops into Ruthenia for the purpose of turning it over to Hungary. But Poland gave up this design on being warned by Germany and Italy that the Vienna mediation award must be accepted unequivocally. *New York Times*, November 26, 1938.

64. During this period Germany imposed pressure—almost humiliation—on Poland by expelling about 12,000 Polish Jews from Germany. In addition, 9,000 Polish Jews were concentrated on the German side of the Polish frontier awaiting the outcome of negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw. *New York Herald Tribune*, October 31, 1938. Ostensibly this action was to protect Germany against the application of a Polish decree that might have deprived some Jews living in Germany of Polish citizenship, but it was undoubtedly also inspired by the desire to put pressure on Poland to drop its efforts to stop German expansion in Central Europe.

65. For such a proposal, made before the Munich crisis by a Rumanian authority, cf. Michel Antonesco, "Une Nouvelle formule de sécurité en Europe Orientale," *Affaires Danubiennes* (Bucharest), July 1938.

58. Warsaw dispatch, *New York Times*, October 19, 1938.

59. Rome dispatch, *ibid.*, October 3, 1938.

60. Berlin dispatch, *ibid.*, October 16, 1938.

61. *New York Times*, November 1, 1938.

Many observers believe that Hitler will soon demand the cession of Danzig, including Gdynia and the so-called Corridor, in return for giving Poland a new port elsewhere on the Baltic. For a time it was thought that Germany would be willing to turn over Memel to Poland, but within recent weeks the agitation of the German press and the Memel Nazis indicates that Germany is not prepared to surrender its own designs on this territory.⁶⁶ Poles insist that they will fight before giving up Gdynia and the Corridor; but if they do, they will probably be overwhelmed if they stand alone. It seems clear that the security of Poland depends less on its own strength or the support of any present allies than on the self-restraint of Hitler. Although the Polish-French alliance has not been denounced, France clearly is in no mood to defend Poland against attack. The Poles have much less claim on France than did Czechoslovakia, in view of their "independent" foreign policy. France acquiesced in the Partitions at the close of the eighteenth century, and it can do so again. The situation as seen just before the Munich agreement by a leading conservative paper in Poland, *Czas*, is as follows:

"We are informed that certain French circles have threatened us with a denunciation of the alliance with Poland. . . . From whatever circles these threats come, it is unfortunately not difficult to say that the manner in which France has treated its alliance with Czechoslovakia has well demonstrated what this alliance was actually worth. This example is rightly or wrongly a warning for the other allies of France. Under such conditions all threats to denounce the treaty lose much of their importance."

Poland apparently counts more on the self-restraint and unilateral pledges of Hitler than on the alliance with France. In his *Sportspalast* speech of September 26, 1938, Hitler declared he had informed Mr. Chamberlain that Germany had no further territorial ambitions in Europe; he also declared that the non-aggression pact with Poland of January 1934 would "bring about lasting and continuous pacification." Poland believes, moreover, that the new Germany wishes to have only Germans within its borders, in accordance with the doctrine of *Volksstum*, and it points out that there is no area in Poland where the German population

now numbers more than 15 per cent of the total. Nevertheless, if Germany applies to the Polish frontier the doctrine which Warsaw applied in the retrocession of Teschen, it may even demand the return of territory inhabited by a majority of Poles, on the ground that at the end of the World War it was inhabited by a majority of Germans.⁶⁷ As yet it seems too early to say whether, because of the doctrine of *Volksstum*, the new Germany has abandoned its policy of dominating the Vistula and the Baltic—laid down by the Order of Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century and applied by Frederick the Great, Frederick William II and Bismarck.

Poland's fate also depends on the policy Nazi Germany finally adopts toward Soviet Russia. If these two powers should bury their differences and make an alliance, Poland would probably suffer—even to the extent of a new partition. On the other hand, if Germany decides to fight Russia, Poland might extricate itself from an equally difficult position by allying itself with Germany. If such a war resulted in the victory of Germany and Poland, the latter might receive new territories on the Baltic or in Russia proper; but it would probably lose Eastern Galicia, which would form part of an independent Ukraine under German protection. Moreover, the result of such a war would undoubtedly increase German influence over Poland proper. Hitler, however, is not likely to formulate his policy toward the Soviet Union until he has digested his recent gains in Central Europe. Poland, therefore, still has time to increase its internal strength, not only by developing its army but by endeavoring to solve its political, economic and minority problems. The future is unpredictable, but events may produce new opportunities whereby Poland can renew its ties with the West, alter its attitude toward Russia, and strengthen its friendships with the Danubian states and Italy, while maintaining relations with Berlin. The future of Poland is bound to be uneasy for the next few years; only if European peace is finally stabilized will Polish independence be safe.

66. Berlin dispatch, *New York Times*, October 29, 1938; Kaunas dispatch, *ibid.*, October 21, 1938; A.P. dispatch, Berlin, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 28, 1938. Fearing a common danger, Poland and Lithuania signed a pact on November 22, 1938, agreeing to refrain from publishing or broadcasting anything likely to affect adversely such relations. *New York Times*, November 23, 1938.

67. In their comments on the Treaty of Versailles, the German delegation said: "By the settlement of the territorial question in the East provided in Articles 27 and 28, fairly large parts of the Prussian provinces of East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Posen and Silesia, which are not inhabited by any indisputably Polish population, are joined to the Polish State. Without regard to the ethnographic situation, a great number of German towns and extensive and thoroughly German tracts of land are added to Poland." "Comments by the German Delegation on the Condition of Peace," *International Conciliation* (New York, American Association for International Conciliation), October 1919, No. 143, p. 1238.